Section 57 of the Competition Act 2004

Grounds of Decision issued by the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore

In relation to the proposed acquisition of Silicon Laboratories Inc. by Texas Instruments Incorporated

Date: 7 August 2026

Case number: CCS 400-140-2026-005

Confidential information in the original version of this Decision will be redacted from the published version on the public register. Redacted confidential information in the text of the published version of the Decision is denoted by [✂].

I. Introduction

1. On 3 July 2026, the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore ("**CCS**") accepted a joint application by Texas Instruments Incorporated ("**TI**") and Silicon Laboratories Inc. ("**Silicon Labs**") (collectively, the "**Parties**"), through Allen & Gledhill LLP, for a decision pursuant to s 57 of the Competition Act 2004 (the "**Act**") as to whether the proposed acquisition of Silicon Labs by TI (the "**Proposed Transaction**") will infringe s 54 of the Act, if carried into effect.

2. In reviewing the Proposed Transaction, CCS conducted a public consultation from 9 July 2026 to 22 July 2026 and sought feedback from various stakeholders, including competitors and customers of the Parties. The majority of stakeholders that provided feedback did not raise competition concerns in relation to the Proposed Transaction, with the exception of one customer.

3. At the end of the consultation process and after evaluating the available information, CCS has concluded that the Proposed Transaction, if carried into effect, would not infringe s 54 of the Act.

II. The Parties

4. TI is a global semiconductor company that designs, manufactures, and sells analog and embedded processing chips for a broad range of electronic equipment worldwide.[1] TI owns and operates semiconductor wafer fabrication, assembly and test facilities across the United States, Mexico, China, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Germany, which enables it to meet most of its production needs while selectively engaging third-party manufacturers when needed.[2]

5. Silicon Labs is a fabless[3] semiconductor company that develops and supplies wireless connectivity SoCs used as embedded components in a wide range of electronic devices. While Silicon Labs also maintains a legacy portfolio of non-wireless products, its business is primarily focused on wireless connectivity solutions.[4] Silicon Labs designs and develops its products in-house but relies on third parties for their manufacture, assembly and testing.[5]

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[1] Paragraphs 7.1 and 10.5 of Form M1.
[2] Paragraph 10.6 of Form M1.
[3] Fabless semiconductor companies are companies that design and market semiconductor chips but do not own or operate semiconductor fabrication facilities to manufacture them. Fabless semiconductor companies typically outsource the manufacturing of their products to foundries.
[4] Paragraphs 7.2 and 10.9 of Form M1.
[5] Paragraph 10.10 of Form M1.

III. Competition issues

6. The Parties submitted that they overlap in the global supply of the following semiconductor products:

   a. Within wireless connectivity system-on-chips ("**SoCs**"): (i) high performance: Wi-Fi and Bluetooth Classic; and (ii) low power: IEEE 802.15.4, Bluetooth Low Energy ("**BLE**") and Others;

   b. Within non-wireless microcontrollers ("**MCUs**"): (i) 8-bit MCUs; and (ii) 32-bit or greater MCUs;

   c. Power Management Integrated Circuits ("**PMICs**");

   d. Within sensors: (i) magnetic field sensors; (ii) light sensors; and (iii) temperature and other sensors; and

   e. Universal Serial Bus ("**USB**") bridges

   (collectively, the "**Overlapping Products**").

7. One customer raised concerns that the Proposed Transaction would eliminate competition between the Parties in low-power wireless connectivity SoCs, a narrower sub-segment of wireless connectivity SoCs. The same customer also raised concerns on potential bundling and ecosystem lock-in arising from the Parties' combined product portfolio after the Proposed Transaction.[6]

8. In view of the nature of the above horizontal overlaps and the potential vertical and conglomerate relationship highlighted by the Parties and the abovementioned customer, CCS's assessment of the Proposed Transaction focused on the potential non-coordinated[7] and coordinated effects,[8] as well as the highlighted non-horizontal concerns.

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[6] [✂]

[7] Non-coordinated effects arise when there is a loss of competition between the merging parties and the merged entity finds it profitable to raise prices and/or reduce output, or quality or innovation. Paragraph 4.8 of *CCCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers*.

[8] Coordinated effects arise if the merger raises the possibility of firms in the market coordinating their behaviour to raise prices, reduce quality, or output or innovation. Paragraph 4.8 of *CCCS Guidelines on the Substantive Assessment of Mergers*.

IV. Relevant markets

9. Based on the information provided by the Parties and feedback from third parties, CCS's assessment proceeded with reference to the markets for the global-to-global supply of:

    a. Wireless connectivity SoCs;
    b. Non-wireless MCUs;
    c. PMICs;
    d. Sensors; and
    e. USB bridges

    (collectively, the "**Relevant Markets**").

V. Competition assessment

10. Based on the information received, CCS assessed that the Proposed Transaction is unlikely to give rise to non-coordinated effects in Singapore, for the following reasons:

    a. The Parties are not each other's closest competitor, and many competitors continue to exert competitive constraints on the Parties post-Proposed Transaction. Feedback from third parties generally indicates that the Parties are not each other's closest competitor in the supply of the Overlapping Products and that the merged entity is expected to continue to face competition from multiple established global suppliers across the Overlapping Products.[9]

    b. The Proposed Transaction is unlikely to have a material impact in the competitive landscape across the Relevant Markets. Feedback from third parties generally indicates that the Proposed Transaction is unlikely to materially alter the competitive landscape across the Relevant Markets.[10]

11. Based on the information received, CCS assessed that the Proposed Transaction is also unlikely to give rise to coordinated effects in Singapore, for the following reasons:

    a. Presence of many competitors with varying scales of operations. Feedback from third parties generally indicates that the merged entity is expected to continue to face competition from existing competitors of varying scales across the Relevant Markets.[11]

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[9] [✂]
[10] [✂]
[11] [✂]

b. Low degree of market transparency. CCS notes from feedback received[12] and the Parties' submission that pricing of semiconductor products across the Relevant Markets is typically negotiated on an individual basis and depends on a variety of factors. This makes it difficult for the Parties and their competitors to coordinate pricing or terms of sale.

12. Finally, based on the information received, CCS assessed that the Proposed Transaction is unlikely to give rise to non-horizontal effects in Singapore, for the following reasons:

a. The Parties may not command the market power necessary to pursue a bundling strategy that could give rise to such effects.

b. Customers of the Overlapping Products generally procure products on a standalone basis and can switch to alternative sources, given the presence of multiple other established global suppliers.[13] While additional time and resources may be required, such switching would still be possible post-Proposed Transaction.[14]

VI. Conclusion

13. For the reasons above and based on the information available, CCS has assessed that the Proposed Transaction, if carried into effect, would not lead to a substantial lessening of competition in Singapore and consequently, would not infringe s 54 of the Act.

14. In accordance with s 57(7) of the Act, the decision will be valid for a period of one year from the date of CCS's decision.

ALVIN KOH
CHIEF EXECUTIVE
COMPETITION AND CONSUMER COMMISSION OF SINGAPORE

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[13] [✂]
[14] [✂]